Which attack technique best explains this log pattern, and why did it evade per-account lockout controls?
A vertical brute-force attack targeting a single privileged account with an automated dictionary wordlist until the threshold resets.
A pass-the-hash replay attack injecting stolen NTLM digests directly into Kerberos ticket-granting requests to bypass password validation.
A password-spraying attack testing one common password across many accounts to stay below each account's lockout threshold.
A session-hijacking attack replaying a stolen SAML bearer assertion across multiple federated accounts before the token expiration window.
Show the answer
C. A password-spraying attack testing one common password across many accounts to stay below each account's lockout threshold.
Password spraying (MITRE ATT&CK T1110.003) tests a small number of commonly used passwords horizontally across many usernames so no single account exceeds its failed-login lockout threshold. The single success on an account lacking MFA (j.patel) requires immediate containment, password reset, and MFA enforcement.
A network engineer audits an egress firewall access control list (ACL) evaluated top-down on a first-match basis:
TEXT
Rule 10: PERMIT tcp 10.20.0.0/16 any eq 443
Rule 20: DENY tcp 10.20.4.15/32 any eq 443
Rule 30: PERMIT tcp 10.20.4.15/32 10.30.1.10/32 eq 22
Rule 40: DENY ip any any
What happens when host 10.20.4.15 initiates an outbound TCP/443 connection to 203.0.113.50?
The connection is permitted by Rule 10, because 10.20.4.15 falls inside 10.20.0.0/16 and shadows Rule 20.
The connection is denied by Rule 20, because firewalls always prioritize the longest-prefix /32 host match over a broader /16 subnet entry.
The connection is denied by Rule 40, because conflicting PERMIT and DENY statements on the same destination port fall through to the implicit deny.
The connection is dropped and logged as asymmetric traffic unless Rule 30 is moved above Rule 10 to authorize the source IP address first.
Show the answer
A. The connection is permitted by Rule 10, because 10.20.4.15 falls inside 10.20.0.0/16 and shadows Rule 20.
Standard firewall ACLs evaluate rules sequentially from top to bottom and stop at the first match—unlike routing tables, which use longest-prefix match. Because 10.20.4.15 is within 10.20.0.0/16, Rule 10 matches first and permits TCP/443, shadowing Rule 20; specific DENY rules must precede broader PERMIT rules.
Reference: NIST SP 800-41 Rev. 1 (Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy) / CompTIA Security+ SY0-701
An IAM role AnalyticsReader in AWS has an identity-based policy and attempts to call s3:GetObject on s3://corp-lake-prod/restricted/payroll.csv. Both policies below apply within the same AWS account:
Allowed, because an identity-based Allow attached directly to the calling IAM role takes precedence over a wildcard Principal bucket policy.
Allowed if the role uses temporary STS credentials, because session tokens bypass resource-based bucket restrictions within the same account.
Allowed only after AWS IAM merges both statements using most-permissive union logic for intra-account resource-based and identity policies.
Denied, because AWS IAM policy evaluation mandates that an explicit Deny in any applicable policy overrides every Allow.
Show the answer
D. Denied, because AWS IAM policy evaluation mandates that an explicit Deny in any applicable policy overrides every Allow.
Under AWS IAM policy evaluation logic, access starts at implicit deny; an Allow in an identity-based or same-account resource-based policy grants access only when no explicit Deny matches. An explicit Deny in any applicable policy (identity, resource, SCP, or permissions boundary) unconditionally overrides all Allows.
Reference: AWS IAM Policy Evaluation Logic / ISC2 CISSP Domain 5 (Identity and Access Management)